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Abstract
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model that captures the interaction between
the cash reserves, the risk management policy and the profitability of a non-predictable
irreversible investment opportunity. We consider a firm that has assets in place gener-
ating a stochastic cash-flow stream. The firm has a non-predictable growth opportunity
to expand its operation size by paying a sunk cost. When the opportunity is available,
the firm can finance it either by cash or by costly equity issuance. We provide an
explicit characterization of the firm strategy in terms of investment, hedging, equity
issuance and dividend distribution.
1 Introduction
Both corporate liquidity management and hedging policy have been the topic of a large
academic literature in the last thirty years. The literature aimed to depart from the bench-
mark model of perfect capital markets (Modigliani and Miller, [13]) to explain why the
management of cash holdings and hedging are key determinants in practice to ensure the
permanence of firms. Several directions have been explored for explaining how and why
firms should hold cash reserves and hedge their risks but the literature has mainly fo-
cused on the precautionary demand of cash holdings in order to both meet the operational
needs and avoid a costly outside fund raising in financial distress. Empirical studies have
confirmed the precautionary role of cash holdings by documenting that cash holdings repre-
sent a significant and growing share of corporate wealth (Berk and DeMarzo [3] and Bates,
Kahle, and Stulz [2]).
On the other hand, the literature on corporate finance has somewhat neglected the im-
portance of cash holdings and hedging in the determination of the optimal decision to
undertake an irreversible investment. More precisely, while it is clear from the pecking
order theory that firms prefer to use cash holdings to finance investment in order to avoid
the costs of external financing, few papers have concentrated on the order of magnitude of
the self-financing investment that firm should optimally allocate in a dynamic setting. Up
to now, the real option theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty has assumed
that outside funds can be raised at no cost to finance investment opportunity. As a conse-
quence, the decision to invest is made independently of the firm cash holdings and of the
firm capital structure (see Dixit and Pindyck [7] for a survey). There are few papers that
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model the role of cash reserves in the optimal decision to expand. The first attempt has
been made by Boyle and Guthrie [4] that considers a liquidity constrained firm that must
finance the investment internally. As a continuation of Boyle and Guthrie’s work, Decamps
and Villeneuve [6] study the interaction between dividend policy and investment decision
in a growth opportunity of a liquidity constrained firm that has no access to external funds.
They characterize situations where it is optimal to postpone dividend distribution in or-
der to invest at a subsequent date in the growth opportunity. Hugonnier, Malamud and
Morellec [11] considers the same type of interactions between dividend distribution and ca-
pacity expansion when firm face uncertainty regarding their ability to raise external funds.
Asvanunt, Broadie and Sundaresan (2010) develop a structural model that captures the
interaction between the cash reserve and investment opportunity for a firm that has some
debt outstanding. Finally, Guo and Pham [9] considers a model where a company has an
option to invest in a way of producing a good and can continuously adjust its production
capacity.
In this paper, we develop a model in continuous time whose objective is to capture the
dual role of cash holdings and hedging decisions. The first one is the well-documented
precautionary role of cash reserves which provide liquidity in financial distress while the
second one is the frictionless financing of investment opportunities.
Our analysis shows that when capital supply is costly, irreversible real investment deci-
sion depends on the firm’s cash holdings. Poor-cash firms may be reluctant to invest in a
growth opportunity because they anticipate future financing constraints whatever the way
of finance the opportunity is. In our model, the firm’s manager has to make three inter-
related decisions: how much cash to hold, whether to hedge and whether to invest with
internal or external funds. The firms find it optimal to hold cash for two motives. First,
cash holdings can be used to cover operating losses. Second, cash holdings can be used
to make a growth opportunity valuable. We prove that even in the case where the firm
maximizes its access to external financing by choosing optimally the level of its internal
funds, it could happen that the firm refuses to undertake an option to expand because
investment increases the liquidity risk.
Finally, the prediction of our model in terms of hedging is new. Traditionally, because
cash holdings are used to avoid inefficient closure, the shareholder value function is concave
which implies a willingness to decrease the level of uncertainty by using hedging instru-
ments (see Højgaard and Taksar [10] for a rigorous treatment of this result). For a large set
of parameters, we find that the concavity feature still holds in our model in the presence of
a growth opportunity. As a consequence, the firm is willing to buy hedging and the level
of hedging policy is a decreasing function of the level of cash holdings. Poor-cash firms are
more ready to hedge and the firm’s manager ceases to buy hedging instruments when the
cash holdings are close to the threshold above which dividend distribution is optimal. The
novel implication of our model is given by situation where the continuation shareholder
value after the arrival of the investment opportunity exhibits local convexity. In that case,
the firm hedging policy before the arrival of the opportunity is non monotonic and there is
a gamble by ceasing to hedge to increase cash holdings in order to make the growth option
valuable.
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Using the dynamic programming principle, we solve the mixed regular/singular control
problem faced by the firm’s manager into a two-stage procedure. After the arrival date
of the investment opportunity, we solve explicitly the two control problems associated
respectively to the decision to invest or not. We have to solve a non linear Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman variational inequalities and to validate the optimality of this solution by
a verification theorem. Before the arrival date of the investment opportunity, we have to
solve a non standard mixed regular/singular control problem whose value is known at a
random time T corresponding to the arrival of the investment opportunity. The paper is
organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and describes the decision variables.
Section 3 is devoted to the analytical characterization of both the value function and the
optimal policy. Section 4 examines the special case of costless hedging. Section 5 gives
numerical illustration in the general case.
2 The model
We first describe the firm’s economic environment and the investment opportunity, then
introduce the firm’s external financing costs and its opportunity cost of holding cash, and
finally present the risk management policy.
2.1 Production technology
The firm uses physical capital for production. We denote by Kt the level of capital stock at
time t. At time 0, the level of capital is normalized to unity. The firm’s operating revenue
Xt at time t is proportional to its capital stock Kt, and is given by
dXt = Kt(µdt+ σdWt + σhdW
h
t ),
where (Wt,W
h
t ) is a standard bi dimensional Brownian motion. The first Brownian com-
ponent Wt represents the part of business risk that cannot be hedged by a financial market
while the second Brownian component W ht represent the part of business risk that can be
hedged by a financial market.
We assume that the firm has a non predictable investment opportunity that will appear at
a random date T . Once the investment opportunity has come, the firm has the option to
undertake it immediately or abandon it for ever. We introduce the binary control variable
u ∈ {0, 1} to model this investment decision. If the firm decides to undertake the invest-
ment project (u = 1), we assume that the level of capital stock doubles. Hence, the capital
stock process Kt evolves as:
Kt = (1−Nt) + (1 + u)Nt,
where Nt = 1 {t≥T} is the counting process that jumps from zero to unity when the invest-
ment opportunity appears. The law of the investment appearance is assumed both to be
independent of the activity in place and to be exponentially distributed with parameter λ,
that is
P(T ≤ t) = 1− e−λt.
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2.2 Liquidity Management
Let M denote the firm’s cash reserve. In our model, provided that the firm’s cash reserve
is positive, the firm keeps living with probability one. However, when the firm runs out
of cash, it has to either raise external funds to continue operating, or it must liquidate its
assets. If the firm chooses to raise external funds, it must bear an external financing costs
1− α proportional to the amount issued. We denote by Rt the firm’s cumulative external
financing up to time t.
The rate of return of the cash reserves inside the firm is the risk-free rate r minus a cost
0 < δ < r that captures the free cash-flow agency costs introduced in the literature by
Jensen. In the presence of such a cost of holding cash, the shareholder value increases when
the firm distributes cash back to shareholders above an optimal threshold. We will denote
by Zt the cumulative amount of dividends distributed up to time t.
2.3 Hedging
In addition to liquidity management, the firm can also reduce its operating revenues risk by
investing in financial assets which are negatively correlated with its own business risk. We
assume that the firm can only hedge the risk modeled by the second Brownian motion W ht .
Because there is a friction p per unit of time on the financial hedging market, the firm has
to choose optimally a fraction ψ of its total cash reserves to buy the hedging instrument
ψ ∈ [0, 1]. The cost of hedging is then
Ktψt(σhW
h
t + p dt).
In our model, it will be optimal to hedge fully (ψ = 1) when the hedging is costless (p = 0)
when the shareholder value function will be concave.
2.4 Financing the investment opportunity
When the firm decides to undertake the investment project, the firm management has
to choose the optimal way to finance it. In this model, we assume that the investment
opportunity entails a sunk cost I. The firm can self-finance an amount a ≤ I on its cash
reserves and issue equity on the capital market to finance the difference I − a. We model
frictions on the capital market by introducing a cost of dilution β. Even cash-rich firms may
have incentives to issue equity because a self-financing investment strategy lowers the level
of cash reserve and thus increases the probability to be in financial distress after investment.
There is a trade-off between the cost of equity issuance to finance expansion measured by
β and the cost of recapitalization α in case of financial distress. The costs do not only
represent the underwriting and administrative fees but also asymmetric informational cost
as well. We assume that the recapitalization cost is more important than the expansion
cost , namely α ≤ β.
2.5 Mathematical formulation
Consider a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration (Ft)t≥0 which satisfies the
usual conditions. Let us assume that the probability space is endowed with a standard bi
4
dimensional Brownian motion (Wt,W
h
t ). The firm cash reserve Mt evolves as
dMt = (r − δ)Mt dt+ dXt − ((1−Nt) + (1 + u)Nt)ψt(σhdW ht + p dt)− dZt + αdRt
− 11{u=1}adNt (2.1)
where the first term is the interest income, the second term is the revenue from production,
the third term is the cost of hedging, the fourth term is the dividend payout, the fifth term
is the cash inflow from external financing and the last term is the cost of self-financing.
The dividend and issuance processes are assumed to be Ft adapted, right-continuous and
non decreasing with Z0 = R0 = 0.
To summarize, the firm management has to handle with the following control variables.
• the decision to invest u ∈ {0, 1},
• the dividend payout Z,
• the issuance process R,
• the fraction of hedging ψ ∈ [0, 1],
• the level of self-financing a.
• the default time τB
We denote by A the set of admissible control variable pi = (u, Z,R, ψ, a, τB) and we assume
that
A = {pi,Mpit ≥ 0,MpiτB = 0 on {τB < +∞}, e−rtMpit in L1, and e−rtMpit → 0 p.s and in L1}.
Shareholders are risk-neutral and discount future cash-flows at the risk-free interest rate r.
Let us denote by pi the set of control variables. The shareholder value function at time t is
given by ( see for instance [14])
Vt = ess sup
pi
Et
(∫ τB
t
e−rs(dZs − dRs − I − a
β
11{u=1}dNs)
)
.
In our Markovian framework, Vt is a deterministic function of both the level of cash Mt and
the indicator of the presence of the investment opportunity Nt. That is, Vt = V (Nt,Mt)
where for n = 0, 1 and m ≥ 0,
V (n,m) = sup
pi∈A
E
(∫ τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs − I − a
β
11{u=1}dNs)
)
In the absence of external financing costs (α = β = 1), the optimal strategy would be
to distribute the initial cash reserve M0 as dividends and to offset profits and losses by
payments to or from shareholders, in other words the firm’s operating revenue Xt would
coincide with Zt−Rt. We call this strategy first best (FB) in the sense that it corresponds
to the maximal value that the shareholders may extract from the project see Proposition
2.1. In that case, shareholders value would be computed as follows:
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• If the firm invest in the opportunity.
– when n = 1,
VFB(1,m) = m+
2µ
r
,
– when n = 0,
VFB(0,m) = m+ E
∫ T
0
e−rsµdt+ E
∫ ∞
T
e−rs2µds− IE(e−rT )
= m+
µ
r
(
1 +
λ
r + λ
)
− I λ
r + λ
.
• If the firm does not invest
VFB(0,m) = VFB(1,m) = m+
µ
r
,
As a consequence, it is optimal to invest when there is no costs of external finance if and
only if I ≤ µr . Hereafter, we will assume
Assumption 2.1 The investment cost is lower than the expected value of the growth op-
portunity,
I ≤ µ
r
.
Next Proposition specifies the above reasoning and gives a natural upper bound for the
shareholders value function.
Proposition 2.1 We have V (n,m) ≤ VFB(n,m) for any pair (n,m) ∈ {0, 1} × R+.
Proof: Let pi ∈ A and assume that n = 0. We have
0 = e−rτBMpiτB = m+
∫ τB
0
e−rsdMs − r
∫ τB
0
e−rsMpis ds.
Using Equation (2.1), we obtain
0 = m+
∫ τB
0
e−rsdXs −
∫ τB
0
e−rs((1−Ns) + (1 + u)Ns)ψs(σhdW hs + p ds)
−
∫ τB
0
e−rs(dZt − αdRt)−
∫ τB
0
e−rs11{u=1}adNs − δ
∫ τB
0
e−rsMpis ds.
Because, Mpit , ψ and p are non negative, we get(∫ τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs − I − a
β
11{u=1}dNs)
)
≤ m+
∫ τB
0
e−rsKsµds+HτB
− (1− α)
∫ τB
0
e−rsdRs
−
(
I − a
β
+ a
)
11{u=1}
∫ τB
0
e−rsdNs,
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where
Ht =
∫ t
0
e−rsKsσdWs +
∫ t
0
e−rs((1−Ns) + (1 + u)Ns)(1− ψs)σhdW hs .
Because Ks and ψs are bounded, the quadratic variation of H satisfies < H >∞< ∞ and
thus (Ht)t≥0 is uniformly integrable. Hence, E(HτB ) = 0 by the Optional sampling theorem
([12] Theorem 3.22) .
Because (Rt)t≥0 is increasing and β ≤ 1, we get
E
(∫ τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs − I − a
β
11{u=1}dNs)
)
≤ m+ E
(∫ τB
0
e−rsKsµds− Ie−rT 11{u=1}11{T<τB}
)
≤ m+ E
(
E
(∫ τB
0
e−rsKsµds|u=0
)
11{u=0}
)
+ E
(
E
(∫ τB
0
e−rsKsµds− Ie−rT |u=1
)
11{u=1}
)
.
Now,
E
(∫ τB
0
e−rsKsµds|u=0
)
≤ µ
r
and
E
(∫ τB
0
e−rsKsµds− Ie−rT |u=1
)
≤ µ
r
(
1 +
λ
r + λ
)
− I λ
r + λ
.
Therefore,
E
(∫ τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs − I − a
β
11{u=1}dNs)
)
≤ max
(
m+
µ
r
,m+
µ
r
(
1 +
λ
r + λ
)
− I λ
r + λ
)
= VFB(0,m).

3 Analytical Characterization of the optimal policy of the
firm
In order to compute the two value functions V (0, .) and V (1, .), we will proceed recursively
with respect to the arrival date of the investment opportunity T .
3.1 After the arrival date of the investment opportunity
Let us first assume that the investment opportunity has already occurred, that is t ≥ T or
equivalently Nt = 1. At date T , either the firm has undertaken the investment (u = 1) or
the firm has given up the investment opportunity (u = 0). Let us characterize the value
function associated to each situation.
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Assume first that the investment opportunity has not been undertaken at time T or equiv-
alently u = 0. Therefore, cash reserves evolve as
dMt = (r − δ)Mt dt+ µdt+ σdWt + σhW ht − ψt(σhW ht + p dt) (3.2)
− dZt + αdRt. (3.3)
Denote by W 0 the shareholders value function associated to this scenario. That is
W 0(m) = sup
pi
E
(∫ τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs)
)
,
where the cash reserves process Mt follows (3.2) with M0 = m.
Next proposition gives some results about the dependence of the value function with respect
to both hedging cost p and profitability µ.
Proposition 3.2 The function W 0 is a decreasing function of p and an increasing function
of µ.
Proof: Let p > p0 . When the hedging cost is p0, the cash reserves evolve as
dMt = (r − δ)Mt dt+ µdt+ σdWt + σhW ht − ψt(σhW ht + p0 dt) (3.4)
− dZt + αdRt.
We write W 0(m, p) to highlight the dependence of the value function with respect to the
hedging cost p.
Let (Zεt , R
ε
t , ψ
ε) an ε−optimal strategy for W 0 when the hedging cost is p and insert
the policy (Zεt +
∫ t
0 ψ
ε
s(p− p0) ds,Rεt , ψε) in equation (3.4) to obtain
W 0(m, p0) ≥ W 0(m, p)− ε+ E
(∫ τB
0
e−rsψεs(p− p0) ds
)
≥ W 0(m, p)− ε
for arbitrarily ε.
The proof of the behavior of W 0 with respect to the profitability µ is similar and thus
omitted. 
The analytical characterization in terms of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations of mixed
singular/regular control problems is now well established (see for instance Fleming and
Soner [8]) and we expect that the value function W 0 is a solution of the free boundary
problem
max
(
max
ψ∈(0,1)
L(ψ)W, 1−W ′,W ′ − 1
α
)
= 0 (3.5)
where
L(ψ)W =
{(
σ2 + (1− ψ)2σ2h
2
)
(W )
′′
+ [(r − δ)m+ µ− ψp] (W )′ − rW
}
(3.6)
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However, it is difficult in general to prove that there is an unique solution to (3.5) in a
classical sense. In order to prove that W 0 is a solution of (3.5), we have to use economic
intuition. Costly external finance leads shareholders to accumulate cash reserves in order
to reduce the risk of bearing these costs. However, the marginal value of these reserves is
likely to decrease (as the level of reserves increases) since external financing then becomes
less likely. This speaks for a concave value function. The concavity of the value function,
together with a marginal value bounded below by one, yields that shareholders will dis-
tribute dividends when the marginal value of the firm is exactly one. Therefore, we claim
the existence of a threshold b∗0 above which the firm distributes all the surplus as dividends.
On the other hand, it is optimal for the firm to wait that the cash reserve is zero to raise
new funds. This means that we are looking for a pair (W 0, b∗0) such that
max
ψ∈(0,1]
L(ψ)W 0 = 0 for m ≤ b∗0
and
(W 0)
′
(b∗0) = 1, (W
0)
′′
(b∗0) = 0 and (W
0)
′
(0) =
1
α
.
The following verification theorem establishes the desired result.
Proposition 3.3 Assume there exists a twice continuously differentiable concave function
W and a constant b∗0 such that
∀m ≤ b∗0 max
ψ∈(0,1]
L(ψ)W = 0 and W
′
(m) ≥ 1,W ′(m) ≤ 1
α
(3.7)
∀m ≥ b∗0 W
′
(m) = 1 and max
ψ∈(0,1]
L(ψ)W ≤ 0 (3.8)
together with the initial condition:
max(−W (0), 1
α
−W ′(0)) = 0, (3.9)
then W = W 0.
Proof: Fix a policy pi ∈ A. According to Proposition 2.1, we may assume that the
random variable
∫ τB
0 e
−rs(dZs−dRs) is in L1. Let us write the processes Zt = Zct +Zdt and
Rt = R
c
t + R
d
t where Z
c
t (resp. R
c
t) are the continuous part of Zt (resp. Rt) and Z
d
t (resp.
Rdt ) are the pure discontinuous part of Zt (resp. Rt). Let:
dMt = (r − δ)Mt dt+ µdt+ σdWt + σhdW ht − ψt(σhdW ht + p dt)
− dZt + αdRt
M0 = m
be the dynamic of cash reserves under the policy (ψt, Zt, Rt). Using the generalized Itoˆ
formula (see Dellacherie and Meyer Theorem VIII.27), we can write:
e−r(t∧τB)W (M(t∧τB)) = W (m) +
∫ (t∧τB)
0
e−rsL(ψs)W (Ms) ds
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+∫ (t∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ms) (σdWt + σhdW
h
t )−
∫ (t∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ms) dZ
c
s
+
∫ (t∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ms)αdR
c
s +
∑
s≤(t∧τB)
e−rs(W (Ms)−W (Ms−)),
Because W satisfies (3.7) and (3.8) the second term of the right hand side is negative.
Because W ′ is bounded, (1 ≤ W ′(m) ≤ 1α) the third term is a centered square integrable
martingale. Taking expectations, we get
E
(
e−r(t∧τB)W (Mt∧τB )
)
≤ W (m)− E
∫ t∧τB
0
e−rsW
′
(Ms) dZs
+ E
∫ t∧τB
0
e−rsW
′
(Ms)αdRs
+ E
∑
s≤t∧τB
e−rs(W (Ms)−W (Ms−)−W ′(Ms−)(Ms −Ms−)).
By concavity W (Ms) −W (Ms−) −W ′(Ms−)(Ms −Ms−) < 0. Therefore, using the fact
that −W ′ ≥ − 1α and W
′ ≥ 1,
W (m) ≥ E
(
e−r(t∧τB)W (Mt∧τB )
)
+ E
∫ t∧τB
0
e−rs (dZs − dRs).
In order to end the proof, we have to get rid of the first-term of the right-hand side. But,
E
(
e−r(t∧τB)W (Mt∧τB )
)
= E
(
e−rτBW (0)11{τB<t}
)
+ E
(
e−rtW (Mt)11{τB>t}
)
.
Now, W (m) ≤W (0) +W ′(0)m by concavity therefore
E
(
e−rtW (Mt)11{τB>t}
) ≤W (0)e−rt +W ′(0)E (e−rtMt) .
Let t tend to ∞ to get (because limt→∞E
(
e−rtMt
)
= 0 for pi ∈ A)
W (m) ≥ E (e−rτBW (0)11{τB<∞})+ E ∫ τB
0
e−rs (dZs − dRs)
≥ E
∫ τB
0
e−rs (dZs − dRs) because W (0) ≥ 0.
The reverse inequality comes from the fact that the solution W of (3.7)-(3.9) is attainable
by an admissible strategy. Nevertheless, we have to distinguish the two cases W (0) = 0
and W
′
(0) = 1α . Because the associated proofs both rely on Skohorod lemma and are thus
quite similar for the two cases, we only focus on the case W
′
(0) = 1α .
Let ψ∗t be the maximizer in (3.7), and let (M∗t , Z∗t , R∗t ) be the solution of
M∗t = m+
∫ t
0
(r − δ)Ms ds+ µds+ σdWs + σhdW hs − ψ∗s(σhdW hs + p ds) + αR∗t − Z∗t ,(3.10)
where
Z∗t =
∫ t
0
11M∗s=b∗0 dZ
∗
s
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and
R∗t =
∫ t
0
11M∗s=0 dR
∗
s
whose existence is guaranteed by standard results on the Skorokhod problem. The strategy
pi∗ = (Z∗t , R∗t , ψ∗,∞) is admissible because M∗t = Mpi
∗
t is bounded due to Equation (3.10).
Using generalized Itoˆ formula again and noting that the process (M∗t )t≥0 is continuous, we
obtain for m ∈ [0, b∗0]
e−rtW (M∗t ) = W (m) +
∫ t
0
e−rsL(ψ∗s)W (M
∗
s ) ds
+
∫ t
0
e−rsW ′(M∗s ) (σdWs + σhdW
h
s )−
∫ t
0
e−rsW
′
(M∗s ) dZ
∗
s
+
∫ t
0
e−rsW
′
(M∗s )αdR
∗
s
Because M∗t ∈ [0, b∗0], the second term vanishes because L(ψ∗s)W (m) = 0 on (0, b∗0). Because
W ′ is bounded, the stochastic integral is a martingale and therefore we get after taking
expectations
E
(
e−rtW (M∗t )
)
= W (m)− E
∫ t
0
e−rsW ′(b∗0) dZ
∗
s
+ E
∫ t
0
e−rsW ′(0)αdR∗s.
Using W ′(0) = 1α , we have
W (m) = E
∫ t
0
e−rs(W ′(b∗0)dZ
∗
s − dR∗s) + E
(
e−rtW (M∗t )
)
.
Let t tend to +∞ to conclude by noting again that W ′(b∗0) = 1 ,W (M∗t ) is bounded by
W (b∗0). 
Remark 3.1 Note that the optimal issuance policy is stationary. Either, it is optimal to
never issue equity and to default the first time the cash reserves hit zero or it is optimal to
issue equity at each time the cash reserves hit zero. For the latter case, the firm will never
default. As we will see, the optimal equity issuance will depend on the level of issuance cost
α.
We will now focus on the existence of a pair (W, b∗0) that satisfies Proposition 3.3.
We first note that the operator L(ψ) can be decomposed as follows:
L(ψ)W (m) = L(0)W (m)− ψ
(
σ2hW
′′
(m)(1− ψ
2
) + pW
′
(m)
)
.
Therefore, an optimal hedging is a maximization (assuming that W is concave) of the
parabola
−ψ
(
σ2hW
′′
(m)(1− ψ
2
) + pW
′
(m)
)
.
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The first order condition gives
ψ∗(m) = 1 +
p
σ2h
(W )
′
(W )′′
(m).
Two cases have to be considered:
1. σ2hW
′′
+pW
′ ≥ 0. . In that case the maximum of the parabola is below 0 so L(0)W ≥
L(ψ)W for every ψ ∈ [0, 1],
2. σ2hW
′′
+pW
′
< 0. and the maximum of the parabola is in [0, 1] assuming w is concave.
Due to the concavity of W along with W
′ ≥ 1, the optimal level of hedging ψ∗(m)
is strictly lower than one. Therefore, it is never optimal to fully hedge except when
p = 0.
We make the following guess about the features of the value function. We will as-
sume that W 0 is a concave twice continuously differentiable function which implies since
(W 0)
′′
(b∗0) = 0 that there is some 0 ≤ b˜0 < b∗0 such that ψ∗(b˜0) = 0 and ψ∗ = 0 on the
interval (b˜0, b
∗
0). As a consequence, we can split the computation of the value function in
two stages. First, solve on (b˜0, b
∗
0)(
σ2 + σ2h
2
)
(W )
′′
+ [(r − δ)m+ µ] (W )′ − rW = 0
under the boundary conditions
(W )
′
(b∗0) = 1, (W )
′′
(b∗0) = 0,
and secondly, solve on (0, b˜0) the non-linear ordinary differential equation
σ2
2
(W )
′′
+ [(r − δ)m+ µ− p] (W )′ − rW − p
2
2σ2h
((W )
′
)2
(W )′′
(m) = 0
with the boundary condition W (0) = 0 or (W )
′
(0) =
1
α
.
Note that it could happen that b˜0 = 0. In that case, the optimal liquidity management
policy coincides with the one described in [5].
Fix b ≥ 0 and denote by Vb the concave solution of
L(0)Vb = 0 with V
′
b (b) = 1 , V
′′
b (b) = 0.
According to Lemma A.2 in [5], Vb(0) is a strictly decreasing function of b while V
′
b (0) is
a strictly increasing function of b. Because, lim
b→0
Vb(0) =
µ
r
and lim
b→+∞
Vb(0) = −∞ (see
the Internet Appendix of [5]), there exists b0 such that Vb0(0) = 0. Next proposition
characterizes the shareholder value function for α high enough. More precisely,
Proposition 3.4 Assume that V
′
b0
(0) ≥ 1α . There exist a concave twice continuously dif-
ferentiable function W and a threshold b∗0 that satisfy the assumptions of Proposition 3.3.
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Proof: Again, according to Lemma A.2 in [5], there is some b1 > 0 such that V
′
b1
(0) = 1α .
Moreover, the hypothesis V
′
b0
(0) ≥ 1α implies b1 ≤ b0 and thus Vb1(0) > 0. Let us define
θb1(m) = σ
2
hV
′′
b1(m) + pV
′
b1(m). (3.11)
The function
V
′
b1
(m)
V
′′
b1
(m)
is decreasing because the sign of the derivative of
V
′
b1
(m)
V
′′
b1
(m)
is given by
the sign of
σ2 + σ2h
2
((V
′′
b1(m))
2 − V ′b1(m)V
′′′
b1 (m)) = −δ(V
′
b1(m))
2 + rV
′′
b1(m)Vb1(m) < 0.
Therefore, there is at most a threshold m˜1 < b1 such that θb1(m˜1) = 0. The existence of m˜1
is given by the sign of θb1(0) since θb1(b1) = p ≥ 0. Thus, if the hedging cost p is such that
σ2hV
′′
b1(0) +
p
α
≥ 0, (3.12)
then it is optimal to never hedge and the pair (Vb1 , b1) satisfies Proposition 3.3.
Note that
θb(m) =
2σ2h
σ2h + σ
2
rVb(0) +
(
p− 2σ
2
hµ
σ2h + σ
2
)
V
′
b (0). (3.13)
A sufficient condition on the hedging cost p to have (3.12) is thus
p ≥ 2σ
2
hµ
σ2h + σ
2
.
Assume now that p is such that (3.12) does not hold and note m˜1 the solution of θb1(m) = 0.
We are interested now by the existence and the uniqueness of a concave solution to the non
linear O.D.E. on (0, m˜1)
σ2
2
(W )
′′
+ [(r − δ)m+ µ− p] (W )′ − rW − p
2
2σ2h
((W )
′
)2
(W )′′
(m) = 0 (3.14)
with W (m˜1) = Vb1(m˜1) and W
′
(m˜1) = V
′
b1
(m˜1). We first note that if such a concave
solution exists then W
′′
(m˜1) = V
′′
b1
(m˜1) and thus W is locally strictly concave in a left
neighborhood of m˜1. In order to see this, we let m tend to m˜1 in Equation (3.14) and use
the continuous and smooth fit at m˜1 to get
0 =
pW
′
(m˜1)
2
(
1− V
′′
b1
(m˜1)
W ′′(m˜1)
)
+
σ2
2
(
V
′′
b1(m˜1)−W
′′
(m˜1)
)
. (3.15)
Thus the concavity of W implies the continuity of W
′′
at m˜1. If we multiply (3.14) by
W
′′
(m), we see that W
′′
is the root of a second order polynomial equation and thus for
every m ≥ 0
W
′′
(m) =
rW (m)− ((r − δ)m+ µ− p)W ′(m) + ε(m)√∆[W ](m)
σ2
13
where ε(m) = +1 or −1 and
∆[W ](m) = ((r − δ)m+ µ− p)W ′(m)− rW (m))2 + σ2 p
2
σ2h
(W
′
(m))2.
Let’s take the concave solution satisfying ε(m) = −1. We finally obtain the existence and
uniqueness of a concave solution W of (3.14) on (0, m˜1) with continuous and smooth-fit at
m˜1 by the Cauchy-Lipschitz Theorem.
At this stage, for every fixed b, we have the existence and the uniqueness of a concave and
twice continuously differentiable function Wb solution of
L(0)W = 0 on (m˜(b), b),
and
L(ψ∗)W = 0 on (0, m˜(b))
with W
′
b(b) = 1, W
′′
b (b) = 0 and m˜(b) is the root of σ
2
hW
′′
b (m) + pW
′
b(m). We must now
check that there is some b such that W
′
b(0) =
1
α , Wb(0) ≥ 0 and then prove that ψ∗ remains
in [0, 1] on [0, m˜1].
To see this, let us denote k = Vb1 −Wb1 . Similarly to equation (3.11) we introduce
θ˜b1(m) = σ
2
hW
′′
b1(m) + pW
′
b1(m) (3.16)
A straightforward computation yields that  L(0)k(m) = − θ˜
2
b1
(m)
2σ2hW
′′
b1
(m)
on (0, m˜1) where θ˜b1 is
given by Equation (3.16). Therefore, L(0)k ≥ 0 on (0, b1) since Vb1 and Wb1 coincide on
(m˜1, b1) with k(m˜1) = k
′
(m˜1) = k
′′
(m˜1) = 0. Let us differentiate L(0)k(m) on (0, m˜1) to
get (
σ2 + σ2h
2
)
k(3) + (µ+ (r − δ)m)k′′ − δk′ = −
(
θ˜b1 θ˜
′
b1
σ2hW
′′
b1
− θ˜
2
b1
W
′′′
b1
2σ2h(W
′′
b1
)2
)
.
Using smooth-fit at m˜1 and θ˜b1(m˜1) = 0, we get k
(3)(m˜1) = 0. Differentiating one more
time and letting m to m˜1, we get(
σ2 + σ2h
2
)
k(4)(m˜1) =
−(θ˜′b1)2
σ2hW
′′
b1
≥ 0.
Therefore, k is a convex positive function in a left neighborhood of m˜1. We will prove that
k
′
is always non positive m˜1. Assume the contrary and denote by m0 the highest level of
cash such that k
′
(m0) = 0. Note that k must be concave at m0 and thus
L(0)k(m0) =
(
σ2 + σ2h
2
)
k′′(m0)− rk(m0) < 0
which contradicts L(0)k ≥ 0. Hence, W ′b1(0) ≥ 1α .
Set Y (m) = (W (m),W
′
(m)) such that Y
′
= F (m,Y ) with F locally Lipschitz with respect
to Y . Denote by yb =
(
µ+(r−δ)b
r , 1
)
and φ(m, b) the unique solution of the o.d.e such that
φ(b, b) = yb. By Cauchy-Lipschitz Theorem, the function φ is jointly continuous and thus
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there is a b∗0 ≤ b1 such that W
′
b∗0
(0) = 1α .
Besides we know that Wb∗0 is above Vb1 because Vb1 corresponds to an admissible hedging
strategy, thus Wb∗0 > 0.
In order to end the proof, we need to check that the strategy ψ∗ is admissible, that is ψ∗
is in [0, 1] on [0, m˜1]. The solution being concave we know that ψ
∗ < 1 on [0, m˜1].
Using the fact that
(
σ2
2
+
p2
2σ2h
(W
′
)2
(W ′′)2
)W
′′′
= (
p2
σ2h
+ δ)W
′ − ((r − δ)m+ µ− p)W ′′
The sign of (ψ∗)′ is given by the sign of
σ2
2
((W
′′
)2 −W ′W ′′′) = −(W ′)2δ + rWW ′′ < 0
because W is a positive concave function.
We conclude that ψ∗ is under 1, decreasing to 0 on [0, m˜1] and thus ψ∗ satisfies the con-
straints. 
Corollary 3.1 The optimal level of cash b∗0 is an increasing function of the hedging cost p.
Proof: Let p > p0. We write W
0(m, p) to highlight the dependence of the value function
with respect to the hedging cost p. By continuity, we have
W 0(b∗0(p), p)−W 0(b∗0(p0), p0) =
(
1− δ
r
)
(b∗0(p)− b∗0(p0)) .
But using Proposition 3.2, we have
W 0(b∗0(p), p)−W 0(b∗0(p0), p0) = W 0(b∗0(p), p)−W 0(b∗0(p), p0) +W 0(b∗0(p), p0)−W 0(b∗0(p0), p0)
≤ W 0(b∗0(p), p0)−W 0(b∗0(p0), p0).
Using the concavity ofW 0 and the smooth-fit at b∗0(p0) we getW 0(b∗0(p), p0)−W 0(b∗0(p0), p0) ≤
b∗0(p)− b∗0(p0). Consequently,
δ
r
(b∗0(p)− b∗0(p0)) ≥ 0.

Next Corollary gives a sufficient condition to have W 0 = Vb0 .
Corollary 3.2 Assume that V
′
b0
(0) ≤ 1α and p ≥
2σ2hµ
σ2h+σ
2 . Then, the value function W
0
coincides with Vb0.
Proof: Using Equation (3.13), the assumption p ≥ 2σ2hµ
σ2h+σ
2 implies that θb0(0) ≥ 0 because
Vb0 is concave with V
′
b0
(b0) = 1. Because V
′
b0
(0) ≤ 1α , it is easy to check that Vb0 satisfies
the assumptions of Proposition 3.3. Moreover, the optimal strategy is to distribute all the
surplus above b0 as dividend, to do not hedge and to default the first time the cash reserves
hit zero. 
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Remark 3.2 We have an explicit bound p¯ on the hedging cost p, that is p¯ =
2σ2hµ
σ2h+σ
2 above
which it is optimal to never hedge. For p ≥ p¯, the decision to issue equity depends only on
the level of issuance costs α. The threshold p¯ increases with the profitability µ meaning that
the most profitable firm can afford a higher hedging cost but decreases with the idiosyncratic
risk σ. Finally, p¯ increases with the market risk σh.
Figure 3.1 gives an illustration of the optimal equity issuance policy. In the yellow area,
the firm goes bankrupt when the cash reserves hit zero regardless of the hedging policy.
Namely, when α is smaller than 0.15, the issuance cost are so high that an optimal hedging
policy does not prevent the firm to default. In the brown area, the optimal hedging offsets
the issuance cost and for α between 0.15 and 0.26 there is a level p(α) of hedging cost below
which it is optimal to issue equity to avoid bankruptcy. In the dark area, the equity issuance
is always optimal regardless of the hedging policy. To conclude, Figure 3.1 highlights the
impact of an optimal hedging policy on the permanence of firms when external funding is
costly.
(a) Emission and Hedging
Figure 1: Issuance or bankruptcy zone depending on p and α.
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Assume now that the investment has been undertaken u = 1. Regardless of the level
of self-financing a, the cash holdings will evolve independently of a after the investment
decision time T as
dMt = (r − δ)Mt dt+ dXt − 2ψt(σhW ht + p dt)
− dZt + αdRt.
Proceeding analogously as in Proposition 3.3, we can prove that shareholder value function
F after the investment has been made is the concave solution to
max
ψ∈(0,1]
{(
2(σ2 + (1− ψ)2σ2h)
)
F
′′
+ [(r − δ)m+ 2µ− 2ψp]F ′ − rF
}
= 0 (3.17)
under the boundary conditions
F
′
(b∗) = 1, F
′′
(b∗) = 0 and max
(
−F (0), F ′(0)− 1
α
)
= 0.
We will assume that α is closed to one enough in order to have F
′
(0) − 1α = 0 and thus
F (0) > 0. Again, we can decompose the operator L˜(ψ) as follows
L˜(ψ)F (m) = L(0)F (m)− 2ψ(2− ψ)σ2hF
′′
(m)− 2ψpF ′(m).
In that case, the first order condition gives
ψ∗(m) = 1 +
p
2σ2h
F
′
F ′′
(m).
Again, two cases have to be considered
1. 2σ2hF
′′
(m) + pF
′
(m) ≥ 0 where it is optimal to not hedge.
2. 2σ2hF
′′
(m) + pF
′
(m) ≤ 0 where it is optimal to hedge according to the policy ψ∗.
The value function F can be split in the same manner than in the scenario u = 0 and we
have to solve first on (b˜, b∗)
2
(
σ2 + σ2h
)
F
′′
+ [(r − δ)m+ 2µ]F ′ − rF = 0
under the boundary conditions
F
′
(b∗) = 1, F
′′
(b∗) = 0,
and secondly, solve on (0, b˜) the non-linear ordinary differential equation
2σ2F
′′
+ [(r − δ)m+ 2µ− 2p]F ′ − rF − p
2
2σ2h
(F
′
)2
F ′′
(m) = 0
with the boundary condition F
′
(0) =
1
α
.
Note that under the assumption α ≤ β, there exists a level of cash mβ such that F ′(mβ) =
1
β . The value function at time T is thus V (1,MT ) where
V (1,m) = max
(
W 0(m), max
0≤a≤I∧m
(
F (m− a)− I − a
β
))
. (3.18)
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For convenience, we denote by W 1(m) = max0≤a≤I∧m
(
F (m− a)− I−aβ
)
.
We are now in a position to determine the optimal level of self-financing a∗ as a function
of the cash reserves.
Proposition 3.5 The optimal level of self-financing is given by
a∗(m) =

0 if m ≤ mβ
m−mβ if mβ ≤ m ≤ mβ + I
I if m ≥ mβ + I
Therefore, W 1(m) can be decomposed as follows
W 1(m) =

F (m)− Iβ if m ≤ mβ
F (mβ)− Iβ +
m−mβ
β if mβ ≤ m ≤ mβ + I
F (m− I) if m ≥ mβ + I
Note that W 1 is a continuously differentiable function.
Proof: The first order condition gives
1
β
− F ′(m− a) =

≥ 0 if m− a ≥ mβ
= 0 if m− a = mβ
≤ 0 if m− a ≤ mβ
from which we deduce the optimal level of self-financing. 
As soon as the investment opportunity is available, the decision maker has to choose if
he undertakes the growth opportunity by comparing W 0 and W 1. Therefore, the value
function after the arrival date T is V (1,MT ) where
V (1,m) = max
(
W 0(m),W 1(m)
)
(3.19)
3.2 Before the arrival date of the investment opportunity
Applying the dynamic programming principle, we observe that V (0,m) can be written
V (0,m) = sup
pi∈A
{
E
(∫ T∧τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs)
)
+ E
(
e−rTV (1,M0T )11T≤τB
)}
(3.20)
where
dM0t = ((r − δ)M0t + µ)dt+ (σdWt + σhdW ht )− ψ(σhdW ht + p dt)− dZt + αdRt.
But on the other hand,
W 0(m) = sup
pi∈A
{
E
(∫ T∧τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs)
)
+ E
(
e−rTW 0(M0T )11T≤τB
)}
.
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Because V (1, .) ≥ W 0, we obtain that V (0, .) ≥ W 0 which means that ex-ante the growth
opportunity is worthwhile.
Using the arguments preceding Proposition 3.3, we expect that the ex-ante shareholder
value function V (0, .) satisfies
max( max
ψ∈(0,1]
L(ψ)V (0, .) + λ(V (1,m)− V (0, .)), 1− V ′(0, .)) = 0.
under the boundary conditions
V
′
(0, 0) =
1
α
.
Note that V (0, .) is positive because V (0, .) ≥ W 0 > 0 for α satisfying the assumption of
Proposition 3.3. The following proposition establishes the result.
Proposition 3.6 Assume there exists a function W (n,m) and a threshold m∗0 such that
1. W (0,m) is a twice differentiable solution on (0,∞) of
max
ψ∈(0,1]
L(ψ)W (0, .)+λ(V (1,m)−W (0, .) = 0 and W ′(0,m) ≥ 1,W ′(0,m) ≤ 1
α
for m ≤ m∗0,
(3.21)
W
′
(0,m) = 1 for m ≥ m∗0, (3.22)
together with the initial condition:
W (0, 0) ≥ 0 and W ′(0, 0) = 1
α
, (3.23)
2. W(1,m)=V(1,m).
then W (0, .) = V (0, .).
Proof: The proof relies on the same idea as in the one of Proposition 3.3. The main
difference comes from the fact that we do not assume that W (0, .) is concave. Fix a policy
pi = (ψt, Zt, Rt, a, τB) ∈ A and write as usual the processes Zt = Zct +Zdt and Rt = Rct +Rdt .
Let:
dMt = (r − δ)Mt dt+ µdt+ σdWt + σhdW ht − ψt(σhdW ht + p dt)
− dZt + αdRt
M0 = m
be the dynamics of cash reserves under the policy pi and Nt = 11{t≥T}. Using again the
generalized Itoˆ formula, we can write for all t ≥ 0,
e−r(t∧T∧τB)W (N(t∧T∧τB),M(t∧T∧τB)) = W (0,m) +
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsL(ψs)W (Ns,Ms) ds
+
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ns,Ms) (σdWt + σhdW
h
t )
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−
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ns,Ms) dZ
c
s
+
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ns,Ms)αdR
c
s
+
∑
s≤(t∧T∧τB)
e−rs(W (Ns,Ms)−W (Ns,Ms−))
+
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rs(W (Ns,Ms)−W (Ns−,Ms))dNs,
Introducing the martingale
Ht = Nt −
∫ t∧T
0
λ ds,
We obtain
e−r(t∧T∧τB)W (N(t∧T∧τB),M(t∧T∧τB)) = W (0,m)
+
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rs(L(ψs)W (Ns,Ms)
+ λ(W (1,Ms)−W (0,Ms))) ds
+
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ns,Ms) (σdWt + σhdW
h
t )
−
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ns,Ms) dZ
c
s
+
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ns,Ms)αdR
c
s
+
∑
s≤(t∧T∧τB)
e−rs(W (Ns,Ms)−W (Ns,Ms−))
+
∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rs(W (Ns,Ms)−W (Ns−,Ms))dHs,
Using assumptions on W (0, .), the first integral is non positive and because W (0, .) has a
bounded first derivative, the two stochastic integrals are martingales. Finally, the function
W (1, .)−W (0, .) is continuous on [0,∞) with lim
m→∞W (1,m)−W (0,m) = C where C is a
constant. Thus W (1, .)−W (0, .) is bounded and the last term is also a martingale. Taking
expectations, we get
W (0,m) ≥ E
(
e−r(t∧T∧τB)W (Nt∧T∧τB ,Mt∧T∧τB )
)
+ E
(∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ns,Ms) dZ
c
s
)
− E
(∫ (t∧T∧τB)
0
e−rsW
′
(Ns,Ms)αdR
c
s
)
+ E
 ∑
s≤(t∧T∧τB)
e−rs(W (Ns,Ms−)−W (Ns,Ms))

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We assume without loss of generality that the processes Z and R have no common jumps
and write
W (Ns,Ms−)−W (Ns,Ms) = (W (Ns,Ms−)−W (Ns,Ms)) (1 ∆Ms=−∆Zs + 11∆Ms=α∆Rs)
=
(∫ Ms−
Ms
W
′
(Ns, u) du
)
11∆Ms=−∆Zs
+
(∫ Ms−
Ms
W
′
(Ns, u) du
)
11∆Ms=α∆Rs
≥ −∆Ms11∆Ms=−∆Zs +
1
α
∆Ms11∆Ms=α∆Rs
= ∆Zs −∆Rs.
Therefore,
W (0,m) ≥ E
(∫ t∧T∧τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs)
)
+ E
(
e−r(t∧T∧τB)W (Nt∧T∧τB ,Mt∧T∧τB )
)
Now,
E
(
e−r(t∧T∧τB)W (Nt∧T∧τB ,Mt∧T∧τB )
)
= E
(
e−rtW (Nt,Mt)11{t≤min(T,τB)}
)
+ E
(
e−rτBW (NτB ,MτB )11{τB≤min(t,T )}
)
+ E
(
e−rTW (NT ,MT )11{T≤min(t,τB)}
)
Because, (NτB ,MτB ) = (0, 0) on the set {τB ≤ T ∧ t} and because W (0, 0) is positive, the
second term of the right-hand-side is positive. Analogously, because W (0, .) has bounded
first derivative and lim
t→∞E(e
−rtMpit ) = 0 for pi ∈ A, the first term vanishes when t tends to
∞. Finally, it is obvious that e−rTV (1,MT ) is integrable for pi ∈ A and by the dominated
bounded convergence theorem, we get
W (0,m) ≥ E
(∫ T∧τB
0
e−rs(dZs − dRs)
)
+ E
(
e−rTV (1,MT )11T≤τB
)
= V (0,m).
The other inequality can be obtained with the same arguments as in proposition 3.3.

4 Costless hedging
In this section, we assume that the hedging policy is costless, that is p = 0. In that case,
the cash reserves evolves as
dMt = (r − δ)Mt dt+ dXt − dZt + αdRt − 11{u=1}adNt
where
dXt = Kt(µdt+ σdWt).
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Assume that we are at time T with VT = m, the manager acting in the best interest of the
shareholders has to decide if he undertakes the growth opportunity u = 1 or if he maintains
the activity in place u = 0. If he decides to invest, he has also to decide the amount a of
self-financing.
The manager will decide to maintain the activity in place if and only if the maximum value
in (3.19) is W 0. We study now a set of conditions to ensure the optimality of the investment
in the growth opportunity.
For large m, more precisely for m ≥ max(b∗0, b∗ + I) we observe that
W 0(m) = m+
µ
r
− δ
r
b∗0,
and
W 1(m) = F (m− I) = m− I + 2µ
r
− δ
r
b∗.
A necessary condition to make the opportunity worthless (W 0 ≥W 1) is
b∗ − b∗0 ≥
µ− rI
δ
(4.24)
Next Proposition shows that condition (4.24) is also sufficient to make the opportunity
worthless.
Proposition 4.7 The growth opportunity is worthless (W 0(m) ≥ W 1(m)) if and only if
Condition (4.24) is satisfied.
The proof of Proposition 4.7 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1 The function W 0 − F is a decreasing function.
Proof: Let k = W 0 − F . k is infinitely differentiable on (0, b∗0) under condition (4.24).
Let us define the differential operator L˜ by
L˜f = 2σ2f
′′
+ [(r − δ)m+ 2µ] f ′ − δf
Note that F
′
satisfies L˜F
′
= 0 on (0, b∗0). On the other hand,
L˜(W 0)
′
= 3δ(W 0)
′ − (3(r − δ)m+ 2µ)(W 0)′′ .
Therefore, L˜k
′ ≥ 0 on (0, b∗0). Because, k
′
(0) = 0 and k
′
(b∗0) < 0 under condition (4.24),
the maximum principle gives that k
′
is non positive on (0, b∗0) and thus on R+. 
Proof of Proposition 4.7 It is clear that W 1 is always bounded by F (x)− I which cor-
respond to the value function after T for β = 1. According to Lemma 4.1, the function
W 0−(F −I) is decreasing. Because, W 0(b∗0) ≥ F (b∗0)−I under condition (4.24), we deduce
that W 0 ≥ F − I everywhere and thus W 0 ≥W 1. 
Under condition (4.24) and assumption (2.1), we observe that the level of dividend dis-
tribution b∗ corresponding to the decision to invest is larger than the level of dividend
distribution b∗0 corresponding to the decision to not grasp the growth opportunity. Next
Proposition proves that condition (4.24) is not necessary.
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Proposition 4.8 We have b∗ ≥ b∗0.
Proof: Assume the contrary and still denote k = W 0−F . Because b∗ < b∗0 is assumed, we
have k
′
(0) = 0, k
′
(b∗) > 0 and k′′(b∗) < 0. Therefore, there is some y such that k′′(y) = 0
with k
′
(y) > 0 and k
′′′
(y) ≤ 0 and thus L˜k′(y) < 0. But, we still have
L˜(k
′
) = 3δ(W 0)
′ − (3(r − δ)m+ 2µ)(W 0)′′ ≥ 0
which yields to a contradiction. 
The last proposition deserves some comments about the impact of both profitability and
volatility on the dividend distribution. For convenience, we use the notation b∗0 = b(µ, σ)
and b∗ = b(2µ, 2σ). According to [5], we know that the optimal threshold b is an increasing
function of σ and a decreasing function of µ. Proposition 4.8 shows that the volatility effect
dominates the profitability effect since b(µ, σ) ≤ b(2µ, 2σ).
Next Proposition shows that the growth opportunity is worthwhile if and only if the cash
reserves are important enough which give a new insight on the role of cash reserve.
Proposition 4.9 The function W 0 −W 1 is decreasing.
Proof: Let define k = W 0 −W 1. The idea is again to apply the maximum principle
but we have to circumvent the fact that W 1 is not a twice differentiable function. The
derivative of k is a continuous function on (0, b∗0) that is C2 almost everywhere except for
m = mβ and m = mβ + I. A direct computation shows that L˜[k
′
] is non negative at any
point m where k
′
is twice differentiable. Indeed,
• for 0 < m < mβ, W 1(m) = F (m)− I thus L˜[(W 1)′ ](m) = 0. Therefore,
L˜[k
′
] = −[3(r − δ)m+ 2µ](W 0)′′ + 3δ(W 0)′ ≥ 0.
• for mβ < m < mβ + I, (W 1)′ = 1β and thus
L˜[k
′
] = −[3(r − δ)m+ 2µ](W 0)′′ + 3δ(W 0)′ + δ
β
≥ 0.
• for m > mβ + I, L˜[(W 1)′ ](m) = (r − δ)IF ′′(m− I) and therefore
L˜[k
′
] = −[3(r − δ)m+ 2µ](W 0)′′ + 3δ(W 0)′ − (r − δ)IF ′′(m− I) ≥ 0.
We have k
′
(0) = 0, k
′
(mβ) = (W
0)
′
(mβ) − 1β ≤ 0 according to Lemma 4.1. Let introduce
φ(x) = (W 0)
′
(mβ + x)− 1β . Because W 0 concave, we have that φ is a decreasing function
with φ(0) ≤ 0 thus φ(I) ≤ 0 which implies that k′(mβ + I) ≤ 0. Besides k′(b∗+ I) ≤ 0. We
end the demonstration by applying the maximum principle on [0,mβ], [mβ,mβ + I], and
[mβ,mβ + I] separately which gives that k
′
is negative one each interval. 
According to Proposition 4.9, there is a threshold m˜ defined by W 0(m˜) = W 1(m˜) above
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which the growth opportunity is worthwhile when Condition (4.24) is not fulfilled. In the
presence of investment opportunity, m˜ can be viewed as a target level for management
above which the irreversible opportunity to double the size of asset is worthwhile.
Proposition 4.9 has also a nice consequence of the behavior of V (0, .) for large value of cash
reserves.
Proposition 4.10 We have
lim
m→+∞
V (0,m)
m
= 1.
Proof: For large m, we have W 1(m) = W 0(m)+C where C is an explicit constant. Using
Proposition 4.9, we deduce that W 1(m) ≤ W 0(m) + C for all m > 0. Using the dynamic
programming principle (3.20), we have that
V (0,m) ≤W 0(m) + C.
Using V (0,m) ≥ m, we get the result because
lim
m→+∞
W 0(m)
m
= 1.

Remark 4.3 Proposition 4.10 speaks for the existence of a threshold above which the value
function V (0, .) is linear with slope one.
Next Proposition is a first step in the explicit construction of the value function before the
arrival date of the investment opportunity. Let us define
Lλf =
σ2
2
f
′′
+ ((r − δ)x+ µ)f ′ − (r + λ)f.
Proposition 4.11 There exists a twice differentiable function W0 and a threshold b
∗
0,λ such
that LλW0 + λV (1, .) = 0, (W0)
′
(b∗0,λ) = 1, (W0)
′′
(b∗0,λ) = 0 and (W0)
′
(0) = 1α .
Proof: If V (1, .) = W 0 then it is obvious that W 0 and b∗0 satisfies Proposition 4.11. We
thus assume that V (1, b∗ + I) = W 1(b∗ + I). We fix b > b∗ + I and define Wb the solution
of
LλWb + λV (1, .) = 0 (Wb)
′
(b) = 1 (Wb)
′′
(b) = 0.
We first prove that Wb is concave on (b
∗ + I, b).
Because W
′′′
b (b) =
2δ
σ2
, the function Wb is concave in a left neighborhood of b. Assume that
there is some y ∈ (b∗ + I, b) such that (Wb)′′(y) = 0 and (Wb)′′(x) < 0 for x ∈]y, b[. We
have (Wb)
′
(y) ≥ 1 and thus
((r − δ)y + µ)− (r + λ)Wb(y) + λV (1, y) ≤ 0.
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On the other hand,
((r − δ)b+ µ)− (r + λ)Wb(b) + λV (1, b) = 0.
Substracting the last two inequalities, we get because V (1, .) is linear on (b∗ + I, b),
Wb(b)−Wb(y)
b− y ≤ 1−
δ
r + λ
,
which yields to a contradiction. Therefore, Wb is concave on (b
∗ + I, b).
Now, let us define kl = Wb+l−F (.−I−l) for l > 0 where F has been extended on [−I−l, 0].
F is a still a concave function on [−I − l, b∗] and F ′(−I − l) goes to infinity as l goes to
infinity. We have
Lλkl = −(3
4
(r−δ)m+(r − δ)(I + l)
4
+
µ
2
)F
′
(m−I−l)+3
4
rF (m−I−l)−λ(V 1(1, .)−F (m−I−l))
and
(Lλ+(r−δ))k′l = −(
3
4
(r−δ)m+(r − δ)(I + l)
4
+
µ
2
)F
′′
(m−I−l)+3
4
δF (m−I−l)−λ((V 1)′(1, .)−F ′(m−I−l))
A straightforward computation yields to (V 1)
′
(1,m)−F ′(m− I− l) = F ′(m− I)−F ′(m−
I − l) < 0 for m ≥ mβ + I,
(V 1)
′
(1,m)−F ′(m−I) = 1/mβ−F ′(m−I− l) ≤ 0 for m ∈ (mβ,mβ+I) and (V 1)′(1,m)−
F
′
(m− I − l) = F ′(m)− F ′(m− I − l) < 0 for m ≤ mβ. Therefore, (Lλ + (r − δ))k′l ≥ 0.
Because Wb+l is strictly concave on (b
∗+ I, b+ l), k′′l (b
∗+ I + l) < 0 and k′l(b
∗+ I + l) > 0.
Now, two cases have to be considered.
• First case : V (1, .) = W 1, the maximum principle on [0, b∗+ I] implies that k′0(0) > 0
which is equivalent to W
′
b(0) ≥ 1α .
• Second case: according to the maximum principle on [m˜, b∗ + I], k′l(m˜) > 0 so
W
′
b+l(m˜) > F
′
(m˜− I − l).
Because F
′
(−I − l) goes to infinity as l goes to infinity, F ′(m˜ − I − l) > (W 0)′(m˜)
for l large enough. Introduce hl = Wb+l −W 0. For l large enough, the function hl
satisfies
Lλhl = 0
so
(Lλ + (r − δ))h′l = 0
and
h
′
l(m˜) ≥ 0
Applying again the maximum principle between 0 and m˜, we obtain that W
′
b+l(0) ≥ 1α
for l large enough.
The function b→W ′b(0) is continuous (Cauchy-Lipschitz Theorem) and because W
′
0(0) = 1
there is b∗0,λ such that W
′
b∗0,λ
(0) = 1α . 
Note that if the solution W0 of Proposition 4.11 is concave then the shareholder value
function is V (0, .) = W0 according to Proposition 3.6. The next two Propositions give
sufficient conditions for the concavity of W0.
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Proposition 4.12 If δλ ≥ 1−αα then W0 is concave.
Proof: Assume there is some x ≤ b∗0,λ such that W
′′
0 (x) = 0 and W
′′
0 < 0 on ]x, b
∗
0,λ[.
Because W0 is concave on (x, b
∗
0,λ), we must have W
′
0(x) ≥ 1 and W
′′′
0 (x) ≤ 0.
First, suppose that x 6= m˜. Therefore, V (1, .) is differentiable at x and thus
σ2
2
W
′′′
0 (x)− (δ + λ)W
′
0(x) + λV
′
(1, x) = 0.
This implies
V
′
(1, x) ≥ 1 + δ
λ
.
Now, suppose that x = m˜. We introduce the function
φ(m) =
λV (1, .) + [(r − δ)m+ µ]W ′0(m)
r + λ
.
By assumption, φ is differentiable on (x, b∗0,λ) and we have W0(b
∗
0,λ) = φ(b
∗
0,λ) and W0(x) =
φ(x). By Rolle’s theorem, there exists y ∈ (x, b∗0,λ) such that W
′
0(y) = φ
′
(y) yielding as in
the first case (because W0 is concave on y ∈ (x, b∗0,λ))
V
′
(1, x) ≥ 1 + δ
λ
Using the hypothesis δλ ≥ 1−αα , we get V
′
(1, x) ≥ 1α which yields to a contradiction and
ends the proof. 
Proposition 4.13 If the set of parameters are such that V1 = W
1 then W0 is concave and
thus V (0, .) = W0.
Proof: Assume that there is some x0 < b
∗
0,λ such that W
′′
0 (x0) = 0 and W
′′
0 (x) ≤ 0 for
x ∈ (x0, b∗0,λ). First, we will prove that W
′
0(x0) <
1
α . Differentiating the o.d.e, we get
σ2
2
W
′′′
0 (x0)− (δ + λ)W
′
0(x0) + λ(W
1)
′
(x0) = 0.
Because W
′′′
0 (x0) ≤ 0, we must have
W
′
0(x0) ≤
λ
λ+ δ
(W 1)
′
(x0) ≤ λ
λ+ δ
1
α
<
1
α
.
Now, the boundary condition W
′
0(0) =
1
α implies that W0 cannot be convex on (0, x0)
because W
′
0(x0) <
1
α . Thus, there is some y0 < x0 such that W
′′
0 (y0) = 0 and W0 strictly
convex on (y0, x0). As a consequence, W
′′′
0 (y0) ≥ 0. Because W 1 is concave, the function
k(x) =
σ2
2
W
′′′
0 (x) + ((r − δ)x+ µ)W
′′
0 (x)− (δ + λ)W
′
0(x)
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is increasing and thus k(y0) ≤ k(x0).
But,
k(y0) =
σ2
2
W
′′′
0 (y0)− (δ + λ)W
′
0(y0) ≥ −(δ + λ)W
′
0(y0),
and
k(x0) =
σ2
2
W
′′′
0 (x0)− (δ + λ)W
′
0(x0) ≤ −(δ + λ)W
′
0(x0).
Therefore, k increasing implies W
′
0(x0) ≤ W
′
0(y0) which contradicts W0 strictly convex on
(y0, x0). Therefore, x0 does not exist and W0 is concave. 
We are now in a position to prove the main result of this section. Next Proposition
establishes the existence of a solution to the free boundary problem of proposition 3.6. Let
Lλ(ψ)f =
σ2 + (1− ψ)2σ2h
2
f
′′
+ ((r − δ)x+ µ)f ′ − (r + λ)f.
Proposition 4.14 There exists a twice differentiable function U and a threshold m∗0 such
that
max(Lλ(0), Lλ(1))U + λV (1, .) = 0,
and
(U)
′
(m∗0) = 1, (U)
′′
(m∗0) = 0 and (U)
′
(0) =
1
α
.
Moreover, the value function V (0, .) coincides with U .
Proof: The proof relies on the study of the following boundary value problem
max(Lλ(0), Lλ(1))Ub + λV (1, .) = 0, (Ub)
′
(b) = 1, (Ub)
′′
(b) = 0.
First, we prove that Ub is concave for b large enough. Let Vb the solution of
Lλ(1)Vb + λV (1, .) = 0, (Vb)
′
(b) = 1, (Vb)
′′
(b) = 0.
Note that if the function Vb is concave then Ub = Vb. We know that Vb is concave in a
left neighborhood of b. Assume by a way of contradiction that there is some mb such that
V
′′
b (mb) = 0. Due to the Proposition 4.11, mb < b
∗+I. Thus V ′(m) ≥ 1 for all m ∈ (mb, b).
For b > b∗ + I > m ≥ mb,
σ2
2
V
′′
b (m) =
σ2
2
(
V
′′
b (m)− V
′′
b (b)
)
≤ ((r + λ)(Vb(m)− Vb(b))− (r − δ)(m− b) + λ(V1(b)− V1(m)))
≤ (δ + λ)(m− b) + λ(V1(b)− V1(m))
= (δ + λ)(m− b) + λ(V1(b)− V1(b∗ + I) + V1(b∗ + I)− V1(m))
= (δ + λ)(m− b) + λ(b− (b∗ + I) + V1(b∗ + I)− V1(m))
< δ(b∗ + I − b) + λ(m− (b∗ + I))(1− 1
α
)
< (b∗ + I)(δ + λ(
1
α
− 1))− δb.
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Therefore, for b ≥ (b∗+I)(δ+λ(
1
α
−1))
δ , V
′′
(mb) < 0 which yields to a contradiction.
We have that Ub is concave for b large enough and consequently (see Proposition 4.11)
U
′
b(0) ≥ 1α for some b large enough.
Now, we prove that there is at most two threshold x0 ≤ m˜ ≤ x1 such that U ′′b (xi) = 0.
If if is not the case, U
′′
b would vanish twice in a region where V1 is concave. Proceeding
analogously as in Proposition 4.13, it is straightforward to get a contradiction by working
on each region where V1 is concave .
Because the control ψ admits at most two points of discontinuity, the Cauchy-Lipschtiz
theorem applies and thus the mapping b → U ′b(0) is continuous (see Arnold [1]). Conse-
quently, there is some m∗0 such that U
′
m∗0
(0) = 1α .
Finally, it remains to show that V (0, .) = Um∗0 or equivalently that U
′
m∗0
≥ 1 and U ′m∗0 ≤
1
α .
Let’s show the first assertion. If ever, Um∗0 is concave, there is nothing to prove. As-
sume thus that there is some 0 < x0 < m˜ < x1 such that Um∗0 is concave on (0, x0),
convex on (x0, x1) and concave on (x1,m
∗
0). Note that if we do not have U
′
m∗0
≥ 1 then
by convexity it is equivalent to assume that U
′
m∗0
(x0) < 1. If it is the case, let us define
k(m) = U
′
m∗0
(m)− (W 0)′(m). We have k(0) = 0, k(x0) < 0 and k′′(x0) ≥ 0. Thus, there is
some y < x0 such that k(y) < 0, k
′
(y) = 0 and k
′′
(y) ≥ 0 which yields to a contradiction
because k satisfies on (0, x0)
σ2
2
k
′′
+ (r − δ)m+ µ)k′ − (δ + λ)k = 0.
For the second assertion, the inequality U
′
m∗0
≤ 1α can be obtained working on each region
where V1 is concave similarly to Proposition 4.13.

5 Algorithms and numerical results
We present in this section all the algorithms developed to compute the value function and
the management strategy in terms of hedging, investment, dividend payout and equity
issuance before and after the arrival of the investment opportunity. Then numerical results
are given and discussed to illustrate the different optimal policies.
5.1 Algorithms
After the investment opportunity arrival at date T , we have to solve Equations (3.7) and
(3.8) that both depend on the optimal hedging ψ∗. Knowing the boundary level value b∗0,
the concave solution W of proposition 3.4 satisfies the equation L(0)W = 0 near b∗0 and
can be calculated using a Runge Kutta scheme with step h starting at b∗0 with initial value(
(W )
′
(b∗0), (W 0)
′
(b∗0)
)
= (
(r−δ)b∗0+µ
r , 1) .
The solution of this equation is valid as long as it is optimal to not hedge.
All values
(
(W )(b∗0 − ih), (W 0)
′
(b∗0 − ih)
)
are thus calculated for i = 0 to i˜ until the solution
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reaches the domain where hedging is optimal that is when
ψ∗(b∗0 − i˜h) = 1 +
p
σ2h
((W )
′
)2
(W )′′
(b∗0 − i˜h) > 0
In order to solve the equation for m < b∗0 − i˜h , we used an explicit Runge Kutta scheme :
L(0)W (m− h)− pW (m− h) = p
2
2σ2h
((W )
′
)2
(W )′′
(m)
The function initial value (W (0), (W )
′
(0)) are thus computed .
Algorithm 1 allows us to calculate the value (Wb)
′
(0) for a given threshold b such that Wb
satisfies
∀m ≤ b max
ψ∈(0,1]
L(ψ)Wb = 0 and (Wb)
′
(b) = 1, (Wb)
′′
(b) = 0. (5.25)
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to solve solution without investment (Wb) with threshold b value
given
Require: The problem coefficient, a guess b for b∗0 value,
Ensure: Calculate the function Wb and its derivatives
i = b/h− 1
Initialize Wb(b) =
(r−δ)b+µ
r , (Wb)
′
(b) = 1), (Wb)
′′
(b) = 0.
while i ≥ 0 do
Calculate pseudo hedging : Couv = 1 + p
σ2h
((Wb)
′
)2
(Wb)
′′ ((i+ 1)h)
if 0 ≤ Couv then
Solve one RK step at m = ih L(0)Wb(m)− pWb(m) = p
2
2σ2h
((Wb)
′
)2
(Wb)
′′ (m+ h)
else
Solve one RK step at m = ih L(0)Wb(m) = 0
end if
i = i− 1
end while
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Because the optimal threshold b∗0 is unknown, we propose a dichotomous scheme based
on the empirically observed property that the function b −→ (Wb)′(0) is increasing (recall
that the monotonous property of the initial condition is known to be true for linear operator
and seems to be true in the non linear case). Algorithm 2 gives the dichotomous procedure
to compute b∗0. In the case where the computed function Wb∗0 satisfies Wb∗0(0) < 0 then a
similar dichotomous scheme is used to find b∗1 such that Wb∗1(0) = 0. In that case, the firm
defaults when the cash reserves hit 0.
Algorithm 2 Algorithm to determine b∗0 value, and HJB solution associated
Require: The problem coefficient (α ...), a bound Bmax for b value, precision prec required
on derivative,
Ensure: Calculate the function W , the b∗0 value
bSup = Bmax, solve Algorithm 1 associated to bSup,
bInf = 0., Er = 1.
while Er > prec do
bEst = 0.5(bSup+ bInf) solve Algorithm 1 associated to bEst
er = |W ′(0)− 1./α|
if W
′
(0) > 1./α then
bSup = bEst
else
sInf = bEst
end if
end while
Same algorithms are used to compute the functions F solution of Equation (3.17) and
W 1 given by Proposition 3.5.
Before the arrival date T , a different algorithm has to be used because the function
b→ (Vb)′(0) where Vb is solution of
∀m ≤ b max
ψ∈(0,1]
(L(ψ)− λ)Vb = −λV (1, .) and (Vb)′(b) = 1, (Vb)′′(b) = 0. (5.26)
is very sensitive to the boundary value b. Besides we know that Vb∗0,λ(0) is above W
0(0).
So we prefer to use a dichotomous scheme based on the standard shooting method. Let us
consider the initial boundary value problem
∀m ≤ ba max
ψ∈(0,1]
(L(ψ)− λ)Va = −λV (1, .) and Va(0) = a, V ′a(0) =
1
α
, (Va)
′
(ba) = 1.
(5.27)
The function that associates (Va)
′′
(ba) to a is numerically increasing for a near W
0(0) and
the usual methods for finding roots may be employed here, such as Newton method. The
optimal a∗ such (Va∗)
′′
(ba∗) = 0 is close to W
0(0).
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5.2 Numerical results
We present some results obtained for some set of parameters with the goal to exhibit
some special features of the value function and the hedging strategies. Keeping the same
notations as in previous sections we take the following common values for our numerical
results :
• the annual continuous risk free rate r = 0.05,
• the free cash-flow agency cost per year δ = 0.01,
• the annual volatility of unhedgeable risks associated to production gain σ = 0.2,
• the annual volatility of hedgeable risks associated to production gain σh = 0.2,
• the profitability of the cash reserves per year µ = 0.07,
• the equity issuance cost α = 0.3 (equivalent to a 16.66% interest rate for borrowing
money),
• the investment external financing cost β = 0.8 (equivalent to a 6.25% interest rate
for borrowing money)
The investment cost I will be a parameter taking values between 0.5 and 2 , λ the oppor-
tunity occurrence intensity will evolve between 0.175 to 0.7 (meaning that the opportunity
occurrence in the first year is taken equal to 16.05% and 50.34%), and p the hedging cost
will vary from 0 to 0.015 euros per year for a single unit of capital stock Kt.
The effect of hedging is illustrated on figure 2 with the comparison of the value functions
with costless hedging and without hedging. In that case, it is always optimal to invest be-
cause the function if you invest after T is always above the function if you don’t invest after
T . We notice that the function values with hedging are always above the function values
without hedging which means that optimal hedging policies are worthwhile. As previously
shown, the value function before T is always above the value function after T when the
decision maker decides not to invest. At a first glance, the fact that the value function
before T may be above the function after T may seem odd : it only indicates that the
opportunity is a good news for the firm and it hopes that the investment opportunity will
occurs at the time where the cash level makes it very profitable.
When the investment cost I increases, we check the obvious fact that the investment
function W 1 decreases as shown on figure 2 and 3. When the intensity of the investment
date λ increases, the value function converges to max(W 0,W 1) as shown on figure 4 : the
stochasticity of the opportunity occurrence’s date vanishes (this dates goes to 0 with proba-
bility one). In the limit case where λ is infinite, the investment opportunity is immediately
available and the level of cash reserves determines the optimal decision to growth. In par-
ticular, poor cash-firms do not invest when the two value functions W 0 and W 1 intersect.
Figure 5 gives the hedging strategy in the case of costless hedging for different values
of λ. For high values of λ the optimal hedging strategy exhibits interesting features. In
particular, it is optimal to not hedge in a neighborhood of the level of cash m˜ for which
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(a) No hedge (b) Costless hedging
Figure 2: Comparing function values with and without hedge, p = 0, I = 0.5, λ = 0.175.
(a) I = 1 (b) I = 2
Figure 3: Comparing function values with hedge p = 0, λ = 0.175 for different I values
W 0(m˜) = W 1(m˜). This means that the value function is locally convex around m˜ which
may be interpreted as a gamble to push the level of cash reserve to the right in order to
make the investment valuable. This property highlights the nonlinear behavior of the opti-
mal hedging strategy when there is a high chance to catch a growth opportunity. It departs
from the usual precautionary role of cash reserves by adding a gambling effect due to the
presence of the growth opportunity. Figure 6 shows that the firm value decreases with p as
proved in Proposition 3.2. Moreover, the non linear behavior of the hedging strategy is all
the more observable that the hedging cost p is high. Figure 7,8 give the optimal hedging
strategies for different values of p. We observe that small values of p have a dramatic impact
on the hedging policy with the appearance of two different areas where it is optimal to not
hedge while it is optimal to hedge when p = 0. It has been checked numerically that in this
two areas the value function is locally convex meaning that the option holder was eager for
risk : the cost of hedging is more important than the expected profit of undertaking the
investment with a higher cash level.
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(a) λ = 0.525 (b) λ = 0.7
Figure 4: Comparing function values with hedge p = 0, I = 2 for different λ values.
(a) λ = 0.175 (b) λ = 0.7
Figure 5: Comparing function values with hedge p = 0, I = 2 for different λ values.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have characterized the optimal hedging policy of a liquidity constrained
firm that face uncertainty on its capacity expansion. We proved that the features on
the optimal liquidity management policies in terms of hedging, dividend distribution and
external funding depend crucially both of the hedging costs and of the likelihood of the
capacity expansion. In particular, when the likelihood of the growth opportunity is low, the
shareholder value function is concave before and after the arrival of the opportunity and
the hedging ratio is a decreasing function of cash level that hits zero before the threshold
of dividend distribution. The novel implication of our paper is the non-monotonic feature
of the hedging policy before the arrival of the opportunity when the likelihood of it is
high enough. The shareholder value at the time of the appearance of the opportunity
exhibits local convexity and consequently, the hedging strategy is to hedge for low level of
cash reserves, to cease to hedge for intermediate levels of cash reserves in order to make
profitable the potential growth opportunity, and finally to start hedging again for higher
levels of cash reserves.
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Figure 6: Comparing function values before T with hedge I = 2, λ = 0.7.
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(a) p = 1e− 6
(b) p = 1e− 5
Figure 7: Comparing hedging strategies before T with I = 2 λ = 0.7 for p = 1e − 5 and
p = 1e− 6.
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(a) p = 5e− 3
(b) p = 1e− 2
Figure 8: Comparing hedging strategies before T with I = 2 λ = 0.7 for p = 5e − 3 and
p = 1e− 2.
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